	Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/0 Director of Central Intelligence	72/07 : CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010134-6 25X1 Top Secret
25X1	CCFAS/CIG CY# 285	

National Intelligence Daily

Monday 2 May 1983

Top Secret

CPAS NID 83-103JX

2 May 1983

Copy 285



Top Secret					

25X1

25X1

Contents

Norway: Submarine Hunt Broadened	1
Poland: May Day Demonstrations	2
Vietnam-Kampuchea: Limited Troop Pullout	3
Argentina-Libya: Seeking Closer Ties	4
Colombia-Cuba: Obstacle to Rapprochement	5
France: Proposed Five-Year Defense Plan	6
Brazil-Libya: Agreement on Arms Flights	8
USSR-Middle East: Soviet Reassurances	8
USSR: Jewish Emigration May End	9


Special Analysis

El Salvador: New Military Leadership11

25X1

Top Secret

2 May 1983



Top Secret

2 May 1983

.,		-RDP85T01094R000200010134-6 Top Secret	
		-	25 X ′
NORWAY: Submari	ine Hunt Broadened		
	lened its search for what it b	pelieves is a submarine	051/4
in its territorial wate	rs.		25X′
The Norwegian	Navy is searching an area s	southeast of Stord	
Island where two ci	vilian divers reported sightii	ng a submarine	
conning tower last	Wednesday. Norwegian war have repeatedly fired antisu	ships tracking the	
suspected intruder depth charges in an	nave repeatedly lifed antist attempt to bring it to the st	urface. The US defense	
attache reports, me	eanwhile, that Oslo has begu	ın submarine pa <u>trols to</u>	OFV
block possible esca	ape routes north and south	of Stord Island.	25X′
A Norwegian m	ilitary official in a statement	to the press on Friday	
said the submarine	was not from a NATO coun	try and speculated that	
the Haakonsvern n	oe linked to the visit last wee aval base. The base is some	e 60 kilometers north of	
the main search are			25 X 1
Commont: Ac	a NATO member, Norway is	s apparently trying to	
show that it is as d	etermined as Sweden—a ne	eutral country—to deal	
forcefully with subr	narine intrusions. The Norw	regians have a more	
effective antisubma similar problems, s	arine capability than the Sw uch as water conditions tha	t make sonar detection	
difficult and allow	easy passage to and from o	pen sea.	25 X ′
			25 X 1
			25 X 1
		Top Secret	
	4	2 May 1983	25 X ′
	1	∠ iviay 1900	



2 May 1983

initized copy represed to recorded zor mezion		
	Top Secret	

POLAND: May Day Demonstrations

• .•
The Polish Government had little difficulty containing demonstrations yesterday, but the turnout by thousands of Poles indicates that the political stalemate continues.
Demonstrations took place in 20 cities, according to Polish television. The US Embassy reports that the largest antiregime march—involving 10,000 to 15,000 people—took place in Gdansk. The authorities used water cannons, tear gas, and special riot-control personnel to disperse the protesters.
Lech Walesa did not participate in the demonstrations, although some crowds gathered at his apartment. Western journalists say he was pleased by the protests and that he claims they prove Solidarity still exists.
The US Embassy says that, although as many as 10,000 people may have turned out in Warsaw, the crowds seemed smaller at Masses than when demonstrations were expected in the past. The Embassy also noted the protesters' lack of organization and direction. US officials elsewhere in Poland report that in Krakow, Wroclaw, and Poznan small demonstrations took place to protest the authorized May Day marches there.
Comment: The government and the opposition forces both will claim victory. The authorities will cite the low turnout, while Solidarity supporters will point out that the regime still must use large-scale intimidation to discourage protests.
A few demonstrations could take place tomorrow—Poland's prewar constitution day—even though Solidarity has called only for workers to wear dress clothing and observe a minute of silence. A period of general calm may then follow as Poles await the Pope's arrival on 16 June.

Top Secret

2 May 1983

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Selected Vietnamese Ground Force Divisions



Top Secret

2 May 1983

25X1

	ret	Sec	op	T	
П					

The partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea scheduled to begin today will yield considerable propaganda mileage without measurably degrading Hanoi's military capabilities in the	
country.	25X1
	25X1
Diplomats in Hanoi estimate the pullout could involve between 15,000 and 20,000 troops.	25X1 25X1
In Bangkok last week the Vietnamese Ambassador told the US Ambassador that the Cuu Long Army Corps, six brigades, and a specialized regiment would be withdrawn. He said that there would be no further withdrawals unless Thailand ends its aid to the resistance and that a total withdrawal depends on China's willingness to end its	
threats to Indochina.	25X1
Comment: Hanoi probably hopes to accomplish several objectives:	
 To weaken ASEAN and Chinese support for the resistance by highlighting the strength of Vietnam's position. 	
 To undermine ASEAN unity by linking further troop withdrawals and the promise of negotiations on Kampuchea to an end to Thailand's support for the resistance. 	
 To strengthen Hanoi's claims that the security situation in Kampuchea is improving and that the Phnom Penh regime is consolidating its control. 	
 To push China to make good on its earlier promise to ease tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border if Vietnam begins phased withdrawals from Kampuchea. 	25 X 1
The pullout is unlikely to have a major impact on the military situation. Many of the troops leaving the divisions along the Thai-Kampuchean border apparently are participating in a routine	
rotation.	25X1
The Cuu Long Army Corps probably is the IV Corps, which consists of the 7th, 9th, and 339th divisions. The bulk of the units	
operate in central and west-central Kampuchea, where there is only sporadic resistance.	25X1

Top Secret

	25X1
ARGENTINA-LIBYA: Seeking Closer Ties	
A recent visit to Argentina by a high-level Libyan military	
delegation presages closer bilateral ties.	25X1
The state of the s	
The visit reciprocated a trip to Libya in early March by Argentine military officials.	
	23/1
The US Embassy reports that the Libyans toured	25X1
several defense plants and observed demonstrations of locally produced tanks and aircraft.	25 X 1
produced tanks and anotatt.	20/(1
The Libyans also met with officials of Argentina's nuclear	
commission.	25X1
	25X1
a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a	
Comment : Buenos Aires, despite its aversion to Libyan leader Qadhafi's radical policies, is likely to continue expanding bilateral	
relations. Libya has become an important ally on international	
diplomatic initiatives related to the Falkland Islands.	25X1
In addition, Libya—which previously has had only a limited arms	
relationship with Argentina—is an attractive potential market, as well	
as a source for various kinds of military equipment. Libya's recent	
problems with Brazil are unlikely to have a major impact on Argentine-Libyan ties.	25X1
Argentine-Libyan ties.	- ·
Library and the second second	25X1
Libya currently is seeking nuclear assistance worldwide, and Buenos Aires could provide	25 X 1
research reactors and fuel fabrication services under the terms of a	
long-dormant nuclear agreement it made with Tripoli in 1975.	
	25 X 1

Top Secret

2 May 1983


	10p ocoict	_
		25X1
COLOMBIA-CUBA: Obstacle to Rapprochement		
Continued Cuban support for Colombian insurgents he contributed to the failure of President Betancur's amnesty	nas v program	
and has set back his efforts to normalize relations with His	avana.	
		25X1
The M-19, the second-largest insurgent group in the		
publicly announced early last month that it was resuming warfare. This followed months of negotiations in which the		
leaders led the government to believe they would accept	a pardon.	25 X 1
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	•	05)/4
		25X1
Comment: Betancur evidently believes that closer ti		
would limit Castro's support for the M-19 and reduce vid		
rapprochement also would serve his goals of making Co major hemispheric leader and more independent of the		25 X 1
major normophono locador and more independent of the		25/11
Havana's continuing involvement with the M-19, how		
strengthening the military's distrust of Cuba. Although E probably will not completely abandon his hope for a rap	setancur prochement.	
diplomatic relations are unlikely to be resumed this year		25X1

	Top Secret	
		25 X 1
		į
FRANCE: Proposed Five-Year Defense Plan		
Minister of Defense Hernu has submitted to the cabin- the military program law for 1984 through 1988, which pr		
manpower cuts and slippages in several important weapo	on programs.	25X1
Under Hernu's plan, defense spending would increas 11 percent in real terms over the five-year period. Militar would be reduced by 35,000 personnel. The Army would 22,000 men—with 5,000 coming from French forces in W Germany—and would be reorganized and reequipped to firepower, mobility, and versatility.	y manpower be cut by Vest	25 X 1
The plan also foresees France's sixth and seventh basubmarines, along with their new missiles, being built on Fielding of the mobile, surface-to-surface SX intermediated ballistic missile would be delayed until 1996, however, and deployment of the Hades tactical nuclear missile would sladdition, France would continue to develop an enhanced warhead, build a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and preairborne early warning system.	schedule. te-range nd ip to 1992. In I radiation	25 X 1
Comment: Inflation over the next five years is likely t 5-percent annual rate assumed by the program, and defe		23/(1

Comment: Inflation over the next five years is likely to exceed the 5-percent annual rate assumed by the program, and defense spending is likely to stagnate or decline in real terms over the period. The emphasis on improvements resulting from the planned reorganization of the Army is largely an effort to deflect criticism of budget and manpower cuts for the military. These reductions will cause NATO countries, especially West Germany, to question France's ability to contribute to the conventional defense of Western Europe.

Top Secret

25X1



_	_		-	
Top		~=~	•	
1 (3)(3)	2015	CIE	4	
			-	

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

BRAZIL-LIBYA: Agreement on Arms Flights

Brazil agreed on Friday to allow the cargoes of the impounded Libyan transport planes to be retrieved by Tripoli and flown out aboard a chartered Alitalia aircraft, according to the US Embassy in Brasilia. The Libyan planes and crews reportedly will be permitted to leave tomorrow. A spokesman for the Brazilian Government has told the press that during negotiations Libya threatened to break off all import arrangements with Brazil, including large arms contracts.

Comment: Libyan arms purchases from Brazil will amount to at least \$190 million this year and could exceed \$1.5 billion during the next few years. The importance of this trade to both countries played a large role in bringing about an early resolution of the incident.

USSR-MIDDLE EAST: Soviet Reassurances

The Soviet Ambassador to Jordan told a US Embassy official on Thursday that the USSR has no evidence of an Israeli or Syrian military buildup in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon or in Israel or Syria.

Soviet media, however, continue to contend that Israel is preparing for war against Syria.


Comment: In private conversations with foreigners, most Soviet officials have been echoing the media's alarmist remarks. The candid comments of the Soviet Ambassador to Jordan

suggest that the USSR may be worried that its campaign has raised tensions to the point where Israel—believing the talk of war is a cover for preparations by Syria for hostilities—might mount a preemptive strike. Moscow may reason that these reassuring remarks will reach the Israelis and calm their fears on this score. Such a tactic would allow the Soviets to continue their media campaign, which is designed to impede progress in the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations and on the US peace plan.

2 May 1983

Top Secret

Jewish Emigration From the USSR, 1970-82



589485 **4-83**

Top Secret

2 May 1983

USSR: Jewisł	n Emigration May En	d	
month receive the emigration those who rer New administ citizens more low level since Meanwhile, th	mbassy reports that ed a background brien of all but a handful main easier access to rative procedures ha difficult this year, an e 1979—currently is see creation of an "An ws has been annound	ing on an appare of Jews from the higher education we made emigrated Jewish emigrated bout half the rate-	nt decision to halt USSR and to give and better jobs. on by all Soviet ion—already at a e of last year.
	t: The decision to hal obably are aimed pri		
the Soviet Jev	wish community. Eas tep, but this also wou	ng Jewish assimi	lation would be a
the Soviet Jev logical next st	wish community. Eas	ng Jewish assimi	lation would be a
the Soviet Jev logical next st	wish community. Eas	ng Jewish assimi	lation would be a
the Soviet Jev logical next st	wish community. Eas	ng Jewish assimi	lation would be a

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1



Top Secret				

Special Analysis

EL SALVADOR: New Military Leadership

The recent appointment of General Vides Casanova as Defense Minister has ended the immediate power struggle in the military. Although Vides reportedly has no experience as a field commander, his skills as a mediator and administrator should help him strengthen the unity and professionalism of the armed forces. The war effort probably will continue to be impeded, however, by the serious problems endemic to the military.

25X1

Vides inherits a military institution in transition. A younger generation of officers, frustrated with the cronyism and corruption of some senior leaders, appears impatient for change and advancement. In addition, some subordinate field commanders are critical of the current static defense strategy and resentful of the military's dependence on US aid, which they see as restrictive and unreliable.

25X1

Impact on the Armed Forces

To strengthen military leadership, Vides already has transferred some officers, and he reportedly plans the gradual removal of others loyal to former Defense Minister Garcia at the staff level and in the field.

25X1 25X1

The new Defense Minister also is acting to reduce tensions with the Air Force, which is one of the more dissatisfied elements of the armed forces. To establish his own control, however, Vides has reversed himself on making immediate additional changes in the high command as demanded by Air Force leaders.

25X1

Vides has balanced this decision by pledging to create a new position of commander in chief—which would be ranked in authority between the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff—to oversee all military operations. Air Force officials during a recent meeting with Vides strongly endorsed this plan.

25X1

To help improve coordination, Vides also hopes to assign retired officers with managerial experience to the General Staff.

25X1 25X1

continued

Top Secret

	Top Secret	
		25 X 1
Continuing Problems		
Vides is clearly concerned about the tactical situation		
since October has been marked by increasingly aggressive the guerrillas and generally ineffective sweep operations		
government forces.	Vides will	25X1
reorganize and expand the government's 14 local infantry		
into 36 smaller ones. Vides hopes this will improve mobil standardize field commands, which currently are uneven i	n mannower	
and weapons.		25X1
		20/(1
Despite its merits, the plan poses serious difficulties		
unlikely to be resolved quickly. For example, the reorgan increase an already critical shortage of field-grade office		
25 percent and company-grade officers by more than 10	0 percent. In	
addition, some field commanders probably will remain un	nwilling or	OEV4
unable to carry out aggressive, small unit operations.		25 X 1
Nevertheless, renewed offensive activities by the insu	_	
help reinforce the urgency of Vides's initiatives to improve		
military's tactical position. Guerrilla factions on three from begun their anticipated efforts to seize a number of town		
attack economic targets and government outposts.		25X1
the guerrillas will try to sustain these o	perations at	25X1
least through this month.		25X1
Political Problems		
Political Problems	. Miniaka	
The reported reluctance of Vides to become Defense may partly reflect his appreciation of the pressures he in		
member of the President's political commission. He soon		
take positions on the new constitution, the amnesty decre	ee, and other	
issues, and he probably will incur the enmity of some pol He almost certainly is aware that Garcia's fall was in par		
the maneuverings of civilian rightists, particularly Assem		
D'Aubuisson.	•	25X1
Video in a moderate who adheres to the center with the	orientation of	
Vides is a moderate who adheres to the center-right of the majority of the officer corps. Although he has indicated		
support for issues of special concern to the US, he may	be reluctant	
to sanction direct military enforcement of agrarian reform		
related to several families of the landed aristocracy and has voiced doubts about some aspects of the reform pro		25 X 1
The following about dolling appears of the following pro-	- 	20,(1
The Defense Minister wants to maintain US assistance		
has hinted he will work hard to prosecute National Guard implicated in the murder of US citizens. He sees this as		
sensitive issue for the military, however, and he may avo		
moves until he has fully consolidated his position.		25 X 1

Top Secret 2 May 1983

25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2	
Top Secret	•
	•